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Abstract
Although several papers in the political economy literature suggest a positive re-
lationship between income inequality and redistribution, the data for Latin America
does not support this claim. Countries with more income inequality also have less
redistribution. This paper explores how the degree of imperfection in the political
institutions influences equilibrium redistributive tax rates and income distributions.
A citizen-candidate model is developed (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996 and Besley
and Coate, 1997) in which candidates face a cost for representing other citizens in
politics. Political-economic equilibria for different degrees of imperfection of the
political system are derived and compared. In particular, two distinct cases are
found. Countries where the cost of entry to politics is low can have higher redis-
tribution and lower inequality if the median run as a candidate or ,when there is a
two candidate equilibria, redistribution and inequality could go either way. On the
other hand, countries where the cost of entry is high will not be able to translate
the will of the people into political action and will end up with little redistribution
and high levels of inequality.
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1 Introduction
This paper concerns the redistribution of income through political choice of the tax sys-
tem in a context of imperfect representative democracy. The paper is motivated by the
observation that almost all of the extant theoretical literature on the topic either directs
attention to the political institutions of developed countries or presumes that there is no
difference between developed and developing countries (e.g., Meltzer and Richard, 1981,
Persson and Tabellini, 1994, etc).1 As a consequence the classical literature in political
economy concludes that higher income inequality should be associated with higher rate
of taxation and more redistribution. This argument has been proven incorrect in a recent
empirical study for Latin America (Hubner et al, 2006). Hubner et al found that a strong
record of democracy and a legislative partisan balance are associated with lower levels
of inequality, as are social security and welfare spending under democratic regimes. In
fact, the theory is even under dispute for developed countries (Benabou, 1996 , Perotti,
1996 , Moene and Wallerstein, 2001, Iversen and Soskice, 2006). Iversen and Soskice
(2006) empirically showed that there is diversity in government redistribution in strong
democracies. The authors argue that this is a result of the rules of the political system
(majoritarian versus proportional systems).
The rationale of the classical literature is that in a context where there is free access
to politics, the median voter’s preferred platform would be the one that imposes in an
election (Black, 1948 and Downs, 1957). Therefore, when inequality increases the median
voter is further away from the mean income and would choose a policy of higher taxes
and more redistribution.2
Data shows that countries with more income inequality also have less redistribution. I con-
sider that theoretical models used for developed countries do not work because the institu-
tional arena, though similar in writing, is strikingly different in practice. Latin American
countries have, to different extents, imperfect representative democracies. While there
are other differences among these countries, this paper explores how the degree of im-
perfection in the political institutions influences equilibrium redistributive tax rates and
1There is a growing literature on failed states, e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson (2005). However, since
Latin American countries are democracies, these models do not usually apply to them.
2Using the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2009) I find a negative and non-significant
relationship between the Gini coefficient and the Public Sector Expenditure as percentage of the G.D.P.
Index restricting the sample to democratic countries .
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income distributions.
This paper differs from previous literature on inequality and redistribution on how
to model the problem. Building on Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate
(1997), I adapt the citizen-candidate model to address the relationship between inequality
and political institutions in Latin America.
To operationalize the model I depart as little as possible from the previous assumptions of
the literature on citizen-candidate models. Specifically, the citizen must pay a cost to be
a candidate. This is also present in Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate
(1997), but in this case the cost is associated with the workings of the representative
democracy. I introduce an imperfection in the political institutions by assuming a fixed
entry cost to run as a candidate. In particular, the cost is high in societies where democ-
racy is weakly institutionalized. This means that everyone can vote but not all voices are
being heard. Fragments of the population are not being represented in the political arena
as it will be shown empirically in section 2.
This analysis suggests that if access to politics is costly, it could be the case that
the median voter’s desired platform would not be part of the possible election set. Un-
derstanding the cost of access to politics as an index of the quality of the democratic
system, it can be deduced that institutional conditions are relevant for the subsequent
income institutions dynamics manifested in the economy. Depending on the cost of being
a candidate there will be two main cases3:
1) Democracy is strongly institutionalized and the cost of entry is low. When the median
voter decides to run there is a one candidate equilibrium and I find similar predictions to
Meltzer and Richard 1981.4 I also find two and more candidate equilibriums that break
the relationship between inequality and redistribution. In these cases equally democratic
countries can have different levels of income distribution.
3I assume that the cost is fixed. I acknowledge that these problems have historical roots that I will
not try to disentangle in this paper. This means that initial factor endowments, such as the distribution
of wealth, human capital and political power, play a key role in accounting for the dissimilar degree of
institutional development. For a detail explanation of this argument see (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997,
2002, 2005; Robinson and Sokoloff 2005)
4In Meltzer et al (1981) taxation stops short of full equalization because the median voter recognizes
the trade-off between consumption and leisure, i.e. the disincentive effect of a high tax rate. In the
present model I do not model production, so this trade-off does not appear.
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2) Democracy is weakly institutionalized and the cost of entry is high. The voices of
significant fragments of the population are not being heard. In this case redistribution is
lower and inequality is higher.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I develop the links between inequality,
redistribution and institutions that will be present in the model. In Section 3 I formalize
the argument suggested above. In particular, I propose a model where access to pol-
itics is costly and those who hold more political power have more access to economic
opportunities. Finally, Section 4 concludes and discusses the agenda for future research.
2 Inequality, Redistribution and Institutions
In this section I describe the stylized facts that will be assumed in the model.
2.1 Income Inequality and Redistribution
Latin American countries are amongst the most unequal in the world. Table 1 presents
evidence of high inequality in Latin American countries compared to other developing and
developed nations while Table 2 shows that Latin American countries the fiscal system
is of little help in reducing market income inequality and the redistribution effect of the
government’s fiscal policy is low.
Why is redistribution from rich to poor least present when and where it seems most
needed? The so called Robin Hood paradox (Lindert, 2004) is one the fundamental puz-
zles in the political economy of income redistribution (Iversen, 2006).
In order to address this puzzle, scholars have emphasized both demand and supply side
considerations that affect equilibrium redistributive policies which in turn, determine (in
part) the extent of income redistribution in a society (Robinson 2008). For example, when
studying the demand side of redistribution in OECD countries, scholars have tended to
focus on the preferences of key political and economic actors such as labor unions and
employers (Mares 2003), and also of common citizens (e.g. the median voter). The ap-
plication of the median voters logic to Latin America has its problems. Public opinion
surveys, which are the main tool for tapping the determinants of redistributive prefer-
ences in large segments of the electorate, shows that there is an intense preference for
4
redistribution in the region (Gaviria, 2007 ; Ardanaz, 2009). The reason as to why this
preference for redistribution does not translate into political action is not clear. This
paper provide a possible reason for this stylized fact.5
Table 1: Inequality in Latin America in perspective (Gini coefficient)
Latin America Other Developing Countries OECD Countries
51.73 36.18 28.72
Source: For Latin America and Other Developing Countries Povcalnet (World Bank 2009) and
SEDLAC. For OECD Countries, Luxembourg Income Study (2009).
Table 2: Redistribution Effect in Latin America in perspective
Country Market Income Disposable Income Redistribution
Inequality Inequality Effect
Latin America 51.6 49.58 2.02
Europe 45.9 31.1 14.8
Note: To measure inequality the Gini coefficient is used. The redistribution effect is the difference
between the market inequality (before the government applies the fiscal policy) and the disposable
income inequality. The data comes from Goni et al (2009).
2.2 Institutional Channel
The key assumption in this paper is that representative democracy does not work in
Latin America in the same way that it works on developed countries (i.e. United States,
Canada, Great Britain, etc). Note that even though these countries have different polit-
ical systems (Presidential versus Parliamentary) the workings of their institutions helps
translate, with their own idiosyncracies, the will of the people into political action. Many
models fall short when equalizing the Presidential system in United States with those
in Latin America countries. Let’s imagine for the sake of the argument that a person
5Gaviria (2007) found that income level is a strong predictor of support for redistribution, while suffer
from a lack of political representation. Ardanaz (2009) concludes that objective socioeconomic attributes
are poor predictors of individual level preferences. In this paper I define utilities in accordance with
Gaviria’s results.
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Figure 1: Supreme Court Justices Tenure in Argentina and the U.S., 1863-1999
with no previous knowledge of Argentina and USA gets handed both constitutions. After
reviewing them, this person would come to the conclusion that the political arena as well
as the presidential system are similar in both countries. Then he would then tend to ex-
pect similar workings of the political institutions. However, in Argentina’s representative
democracy the president has far more power than in the United States. The division of
power is blurred because formal rules are not supported by informal norms.
Figure 1, reproduced from Iaryczower et al (2002), illustrates this observation using
data for the tenure of Supreme Court Justices in Argentina and the United States, 1863-
1999.6 Figure 1 shows that while United States Supreme Court Justices tenure ranges from
6 to 16 years for Argentina this number ranges from 0 to 12, with a significantly higher
variance and lower mean. This could not be explained by inspecting both constitutions but
rather attention should be drawn to their interaction with informal institutions. Thus, we
6See Iaryczower et al (2002) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) for more detail.
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will be able to comprehend why several constitutional presidents in Argentina, two in the
last 20 years of democracy, appointed a partisan Supreme Court, what came to be known
during Menem administration as the “automatic majority”.7 Furthermore Jones et al
(2000) explains why the Argentine Congress plays a limited role in the production of public
policy. Provincial governor/party boss(es) are the ones who decide the future of legislators.
Therefore this limits legislators ability to develop a professional legislative career and
reduces their incentives to specialize and to develop strong legislative institutions.8
The importance of adopting a broad-base approach to the understanding of the polit-
ical institutions is true for all Latin American countries, not just for Argentina.9
This imperfection in the representative democratic system can be observed in many
indicators. Figure 2 presents the Voice and Accountability Index which is a measure of the
extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments.
It includes a number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil
liberties and political rights.10 We can observe in the Figure that most Latin American
countries have lower values than industrialized ones. Although a more restricted sample,
the Global Integrity Index shows the same conclusions.11
Table 3 presents the views of the citizen of selected countries about the political
systems under which they live.
More than 99 percent of people living in United States or Canada have primarily
positive opinions about democracy, expressing support and feelings of pride for their po-
litical system. In Latin America the views are substantially different. While Chile has 5
7Ex-President Nestor Kirchner’s term does not appear in the graph, but upon elected to office, his
government pursued impeachment of 3 members of the Supreme Court and appointed their replacements.
8The idea that legislators need to have incentives to invest to develop a legislative career was reinforce
in a recent study. Exploiting a natural experiment in the Argentine House of Representatives and Senate,
Dal Bo and Rossi (2008) found that longer terms enhance legislative performance.
9See the IADB Project on ”Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes and Policy Outcomes” for
a summary of how the political arena was shaped over time and how it works in several case studies for
individual Latin American countries.
10See Kaufmann et al (2008) for the methodology of the indicator aggregation.
11The Global Integrity Index is composed by several indicators, among others the Legal Framework In-
dex, The Practical Implementation of this Legal Framework, and the gap between both. For the Practical
Implementation Index (2007), Latin American countries in the region (Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Mexico and Peru) average 53 point, 21 point less than the average for the industrialized coun-
tries in the sample. (Canada, France, Italy, Spain and United States) See http://www.globalintegrity.org
for the methodology used to construct these indicators.
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Figure 2: A Measure of the Representation of the Citizens by their Governments
Note: Only Chile and Uruguay are colored in light green, indicating that they are in the 75-90th
percentile. The rest is in yellow (50-75th percentile) and orange (25-50th percentile). None is colored in
green (90-100th percentile).
percent of the population who express a negative opinion about Democracy, in the rest
of the countries there is a double digit figure, reaching 25 and 26 percent in the case of
Guatemala and Panama.
In particular, the model’s key assumption suggests that poor individuals suffer more from
this lack of political representation. Figure 3 presents the percentage of people in each
income bracket who have respect and confidence in the political institutions of their own
country. The evidence supports the hypothesis that the poor in Ecuador, Nicaragua and
Panama have less respect for the political institutions than higher income groups in those
countries.12 Therefore, the estimates in Figure 3 are consistent with the hypothesis that
poor citizens suffers more from a lack of political representation.
In sum, the link between institutions and the cost of entering politics is as follows.
Above I have shown that the poor in Latin America suffer from a lack of political rep-
resentation. This institutional deficiency is introduced in the model as a cost of entry
to politics. When this cost is high, the poor can vote but not run as candidates. In
this model, the citizen - candidate implements her preferred policy as there is no possible
policy commitment. Therefore, this set up implies that when the cost of entry to politics
is high, the poor will not be able to participate as candidates and suffer from a lack of
political representation.
12It is interesting to note the case of Chile, the only country that does not display this pattern.
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Table 3: Negative Opinions about Democracy and Reaction Towards Political System
Developed versus Latin American Countries
Country Democracy Support Proud of Respect for
Institutions Institutions Institutions
Canada 0.74 High High Medium
United States 0.76 High High Medium
Chile 5.19 Medium Medium Medium
Ecuador . Medium Low Medium
Guatemala 25 Medium Medium Medium
Nicaragua 13.9 Medium Medium Medium
Panama 26.2 Medium Medium Medium
Paraguay 13.6 Medium Medium Medium
Note: Own estimates based on data from national representative surveys conducted by Vanderbilt Uni-
versity (2006). See annex 2 for more detail.
3 A Simple Model
Consider an economy with n agents, i = {1, ..., n}. The agents live infinite periods and
are considered “citizen-candidates” (in line with Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and
Coate, 1997).13 The timing of the model is the following.
Timing:
1) Any citizen, of any income type, can enter as a political candidate at a cost of F .
2) An election is held among those candidates running. Each citizen chooses the candidate
by maximizing her expected utility. The candidate who gets a plurality of vote wins, with
any ties resolved by the toss of a coin.
3) The elected candidate selects a policy gp; if nobody runs, a default policy g is imple-
mented.
13These papers differ in many aspects, but the main difference lies in the way they cope with multiple
equilibria. Osborne and Slivinski (1996) assume sincere voting while Besley and Coate (1997) assume
strategic voting but impose the requirement that, conditional on any set of candidates, the voting equi-
librium must be weakly undominated.
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Figure 3: Respect for Political Institutions in Latin America by Income Level (Low vs
High Income), 2006
Note: Own estimates based on data from national representative surveys conducted by Vanderbilt
University (2006). For more detail see annex 3
As there is no policy commitment, an elected citizen simply sets policy to maximize
her utility. The citizen who wins the election implements her preferred policy. Promising
anything else is not credible. There are no idiosyncratic utility for holding office (ego-
rent) or from having another making policy (liking a “good-looking” representative) in
this model. I assume sincere voting as experimental data have shown that this is the more
reasonable assumption.14
It is assumed that there is no investment, being the aggregate income equal in all periods.
In this model I do not deal with the disincentive effect of a high tax rate. As there is no
production, redistribution is costless.
Government levies taxes and allocates resources, being the fiscal policy the tool to affect
income distribution. It is also assumed that there must be a balanced budget, so there is
no room for intergenerational redistribution.
Individuals cannot credibly threaten to destroy their endowments (Aumman and Kurz,
1977) what would give them more bargain power to negotiate the equilibrium tax rate.
To access politics (i.e., to be a candidate), a cost F must be paid. It is assumed that F is
a fixed cost, which intuitively reflects how possible is to access politics.(a higher value of
F reflects that only people with high income can access to politics, i.e. a more imperfect
14See Felsenthal and Brichta (1984).
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democracy).15
Let’s also assume, as occurs in every income distribution measure in practice, that
median income is less than mean income (yM < y). In each moment of time, the income
of individual i is given by:
yit+1 = y
i
t + (τ/y)[(y − yit)(ght − g)] (1)
where yit is the income of individual i in period t, τ is the equilibrium tax rate, g
h
t is the
expenditure implemented by the winner in elections in period t, y and g are the income
and expenditure desired by the individual with mean income, which can be proven by
assumption constant in time . Adding for all individual incomes in the economy in (1)
n∑
i=1
yit+1 =
n∑
i=1
{yit + (τ/y)[(y − yit)(ght − g)]} (2)
and I obtain 16
yt+1 = yt (3)
i.e., the economy’s aggregated income is equal for every period, so mean income will
not change (and in accordance with (1), the individual with yt = y, maintains the same
income level in each period, so g, that is the ideal expenditure level for such individual,
also remains constant).
Preferences. In each moment of time, preference of individual i are given by:
wi(ci, g) = (1− τ)yi +H i(g) (4)
where ci is the consumption from individual i in a given moment and H
i(g) is the direct
utility the public expenditure brings to individual i (it is assumed that this function is
concave and H(g)→ 0 when g →∞).
15This is a simplification of Engerman and Sokolof theory. Here I assume that the first stage, when
the forces generate unequal political power, has already operated and I focus only on the persistence and
reproduction of these initial conditions. Endogeneize F is an agenda for future research.
16Proofs can be found in the appendix .
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Government Budget Constrain It is assumed that taxes are proportional to in-
come, while expenditure benefits all individuals in the same manner. The government
budget constraint is
τyt = gt (5)
As a consequence, the fiscal policy is progressive and poorer individuals would prefer a
higher level of expenditure.
Using the government budget constrain it can be proved that if expenditure have impact
only in one period (i.e. if it would not affect the income of the following period as defined
in (1)), the level of desired expenditure by the individual i would be
g?i = H
−1
g (
yi
y
)
This means that poorer individual would prefer a higher level of expenditure (by con-
cavity of H(g)). Therefore, given the scheme proposed in (1), the conclusion that poor
individuals prefer a higher level of expenditure is reinforced.
Participation Constraints For the “citizen candidate” i to decide to enter into
politics two conditions must be meet:
y(1− τ) ≥ F (6)
Ew(I) ≥ Ew(NI) (7)
I denotes that the individual is running for office and NI that she is not running. For
the individual i we have
Ewi(I) =
∑
j∈I
pjw
i(g)− F
Ewi(NI) =
∑
j∈I
pjw
i(g)
being pj the probability of winning the election for individual j when i is one of them.
Equations (6) and (7) indicates both that: a) the individual must have an income level
that allows her to pay the fixed cost to be able to enter, and b) the expected benefit of
running for office must be higher than staying out. In this model when no one runs the
status quo g is implemented.
12
3.1 Cost of Entry to Politics and Multiple Equilibria
Here I analyze different initial conditions, where the difference is the cost of entry to
politics. Only relevant cases will be analyzed, i.e. cases where at least one citizen can
access and be a candidate for the election.
Case 1: F is low
In this case we assume that F is low enough that every individual in the economy satisfy
the incentive-compatibility constrain to participate (6), and everyone solve a symmetrical
problem. In this case everyone can enter as a candidate to the election, as there is a perfect
functioning of the democratic system. The model present more than one equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (One candidate equilibria) The sufficient condition for a one-candidate
equilibrium is wM(gM)−F ≥ wM(g), where the M refers to the median voter, then there
is only one candidate running uncontested and her ideal position is the median.
The intuition for this result is as follows. As the policy preferred by the median voter is
a Condorcet winner, the median candidate would beat any other individual with different
income in an election. If the median has decided to run, no other income type would ever
find it worthwhile to incur the entry cost involved in inducing a two-candidate election.
If there is a single candidate E whose position is different from the median a citizen
whose ideal point is the median could enter and win the election, obtaining a payoff of
wM(gM) − F ≥ wM(gE). Hence, for such a situation to be an equilibrium we need that
the cost of entry to the race to be less than what the median candidate wins as a result
of implementing his preferred policy compared to the one E would have implemented.
In this model it is not profitable for a citizen of the same income type of the candidate
running to enter the race as there is no idiosyncratic utility for holding office.
Let’s consider that the median is running in the election. Then, the policy selected
will be the one preferred by the median voter , that is the one with income
yMt < y
and the level of expenditure in t will be
gMt > g
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Suppose now that there are two candidates in the race with ideal positions symmetrically
around the median (m− ζ,m + ζ), each receiving half of the votes. If ζ is small enough
then no citizen with ideal position in the interval (m − ζ,m + ζ) can enter and win the
race and if ζ is large then there is a citizen that can enter and win. Let F be the critical
value in F below which all citizen that enter lose and above which some entrants wins.
Proposition 2 (Multiple Two candidate equilibria)
a Two-candidate equilibria exist if and only if for at least a pair L = m−ζ, R = m+ζ
this condition holds: For income type L then (1/2)[wL(gL)− wL(gR)] ≥ F . For
income type R then (1/2)[wR(gR)− wR(gL)] ≥ F
b wM(gL = wM(gR).Idealpositionsare(m - ζ,m+ ζ) for some ζ > 0 and ζ ∈ (0, ζc).
The proposition shows, in particular for the case with strong democratic institutions
(F is low), that in two-candidate equilibriums candidates are going to be close from the
median since the cost to participate in the election is low. In this case the median does
not find it profitable to enter the race wM(gM)− F ≤ 1/2[wM(gL) + wM(gR)] The result
shows that equally strong democracies with the same initial conditions can have different
redistribution policies and income distribution trends as the contemporary literature in
redistributive politics for advanced democracies have shown.
It is also possible to find three or more candidate equilibrium that share the main
characteristics as the two-candidate equilibria described above. In this paper I will not
study the specifical characteristics of these cases as for I am interested in analyzing the
income distribution and the main insight that comes out from this three or more candidate
equilibria is the same as the one for two. Equally strong democracies with the same initial
conditions can have different redistribution policies and therefore different levels of income
distribution.
Case 2: F is high, F ≥ yM(1− τ)
In the condition above τ) is indicative and necessary to satisfy condition (6)but ac-
tually τ) is endogenous in this model and chosen by the candidate that win the race. In
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this case the median cannot enter , because (6) it is not satisfied. Three possible subcases
can be found:
a) y(1 − τ) > F > yM(1 − τ): candidates i ∈ I can enter if yM(1 − τ) < yi(1 − τ).
This subcase is similar to the one presented in case 1 under one-candidate equilibrium.
This means that an individual close to the median can run and win the election. A two
or more candidate equilibrium is not possible because no citizen to the left of the median
can be a candidate as (6) it is not satisfied.
b) F = y(1 − τ). The individual with mean income or a citizen just to the right the
mean can enter the race and win the election. Under this scenario income distribution
does not change. Again, a two or more candidate equilibria is not possible.
c) F > y(1− τ), only individuals with income above the mean could enter.
Proposition 3 Multiple One candidate equilibria when F > y(1− τ))
When F > y(1 − τ) there are multiple one candidate equilibria. This equilibrium is not
unique as there are a range of citizen - candidates that can win the race, depending on
the level of F .
a If F = Yc1(1 − τc1) and wYc1(gYc1) − F ≥ wYc1(g) then there is a range of pos-
sible citizen candidates that can run and win the election. The winning candi-
date ∈ [Yc1, Yc2] income range, where Yc1 = F/(1 − τc1). Yc2 > Yc1 and Yc2 =
Yc1 +[w
HF (gHF )−wHF (gMAG)] where HF is the citizen candidate with income equal
to Yc1 and MAG a citizen candidate with income equal to Yc2.
b If Yc2 = YHI , where HI is the citizen with highest income. The winning candidate
∈ [Yc1, Yc2] income range.
c If F = Yc1 = YHI . Then the highest income citizen is the only candidate running
and win the race. There is no fiscal policy and income market inequality is equal to
disposable income inequality.
Given that I am interested in analyzing equilibrium situations, I assume that at least
one individual in that income range satisfied (7). Therefore, an individual with the income
above F
yi ≥ Yc1(1− τc1) = F
whereyi ∈ [Yc1, Yc2]
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will win the election and the expenditure level in t will be
ght = g
i
t < g
Again, a two or more candidate equilibria is not possible.
3.2 Analyzing Results
From the cases in section 3, we observed that when the cost of entering politics is low (i.e.,
case 1 of section 3) the preferred policy by the median voter is imposed in a one-candidate
equilibrium and multiple equilibria arise in a two candidate equilibrium that will support
different levels of income distribution for countries with the same initial conditions. On
the other hand, when the cost of entry is high (specifically, above mean income in case
2c of section 3), the policy implemented implies less expenditure to the one preferred by
the mean voter (and thus is also less from the one desired by the median). Finally, when
the cost of running for office is near mean income, the model predicts stagnation of the
income distribution.
Below I focus in the income distribution for the individuals of the economy in the
different scenarios I raised before.
1) ght = g.
This is a trivial case where the individual with mean income win the election or nobody
runs.
yit+1 = y
i
t ∀i (8)
In this case, there is no redistributive policy, thus, no change for the income distribution.
2)ght = g
M
t > g.
This case could arise when the cost of entry to politics is low in a one-candidate equilib-
rium. Those individuals with income below the mean will have
yit+1 > y
i
t (9)
while those with income above the mean will have
yit+1 < y
i
t (10)
The income of the median citizen increases and the desired expenditure decreases . Every
individual with less income than the mean voter will have their income level raised by
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a range that will approach to zero as her income approaches to the mean income in the
economy, and the reverse will happen to those individuals with income above the median.
Therefore, I conclude that when there is a strong institutionalized democracy, the income
distribution will tend to reflect the positions of the median voter under one-candidate
equilibrium. (i.e., in this case the income distribution will tend to be egalitarian).
3) ght < g.
This case present itself when there are strong restrictions on the access to politics. (F
high). Therefore, those individuals with less income than the mean one will have
yit+1 < y
i
t (11)
while those with more income than the mean one will have
yit+1 > y
i
t (12)
Individuals with income below the mean citizen will have hers income level reduced , while
those with incomes above the mean will have their income level raised each period. In
this case, when there is weak democracy, the income distribution will be oscillating above
a threshold of high inequality. Table 4 presents the average inequality in the history for
Latin America, as well as the lower and upper bound for the region. This information
support the theoretical finding that in weaker democracies inequality tend to be higher.
The number of breaks in the trend for Latin America in the last decades shows that the
relationship is not monotonic and that countries in Latin America oscillate in a threshold
of high income inequity, with the lower bound of income inequality in the history of the
region being higher than inequality in any country in the advanced democracies. In the
annex the information is disaggregated by country.
Table 4: History of Levels of Inequality and Trend Breaks in Latin America
Country Average Lower Upper Number of
Inequality Bound Bound Breaks in the Trend
Latin America 54.59 51.25 57.98 3
Note: To measure inequality the Gini coefficient is used. Own calculations based on SEDLAC(2009).
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4 Conclusions
This study has analyzed the redistribution of income through political choice of the tax
system in a context of imperfect representative democracy. Earlier studies have implic-
itly assumed that the hard letter of the constitution was enough to understand how the
political system works. In contrast, I provide evidence that this is not the case for Latin
America, where fragments of the population are not represented in the political arena.
In this way I try to disentangle how the degree of imperfection in the political institu-
tions influence equilibrium redistributive tax rates and income distributions. I develop a
citizen-candidate model and find 2 distinct cases:
1) Democracy is strongly institutionalized and the cost of entry is low. When the median
voter decide to run we have a one candidate equilibrium and I find similar predictions to
Meltzer and Richard 1981. I also find two and more candidate equilibriums that break
the relationship between inequality and redistribution. In these cases equally democratic
countries with the same initial conditions can have different levels of income distribution.
2) Democracy is weakly institutionalized. The voices of substantial fragments of the
population are not being heard. In this case income distribution will be highly unequal.
This analysis relies on a number of simplifying assumptions. Specifically, the citizens
are fully informed, there is no production, citizens vote sincerely and there is no idiosyn-
cratic utility for holding office (ego-rent).17 This framework could be extended to account
for these cases.
In this model there are no political parties. Agenda for future research could include the
possibility of party formation to cope the cost of entry to politics. This amendment of
the model would increase the critical level of F at which the median voter logic is broken
and generates less redistribution and higher inequality.
Future research should also model the cost of entry endogenously and could take a dy-
namic approach. In a dynamic setting other profitable strategies would arise for the citizen
17For redistributive models where there is imperfect information on part of the citizen on the underlying
structure of the economic system see Piketty (1995). For models where candidates have imperfect infor-
mation about the distribution of citizen ideal positions see Calvert (1985), Roemer (1994) and Wittman
(1997).
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candidates. In particular, they would have incentives to tilt the competitive scenario in
their favor in future elections. This would make equilibria more complex but I expect
the main results to be robust to this specification, i.e. that redistribution is lower and
inequality higher in countries where institutions are weaker (the cost of entry is higher).
Dynamic models could help understand why inequality is a persistent problem in Latin
America.
Nevertheless, these results are quite promising for further research that places an em-
phasis in understanding the workings of informal institutions and how they interact with
formal institution to make distinct political systems. This will allow us to improve our
understanding of political redistribution in Latin American countries.
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6 Appendix
Proposition 0: Given the law of motion of income (1), with yt exogenous and without
investment, then yt+1 = yt ∀t.
Proof : Adding in (1) for all individuals:
n∑
i=1
yit+1 =
n∑
i=1
{yit + (τ/y)[(y − yit)(ght − g)]}
Solving the sums:
yt+1 = yt + (τ/y)[ny(g
h
t − g)− yt(ght − g)]
Then, applying the definition of mean the last two terms of the right expression cancel
out , and
yt+1 = yt
Proof of Proposition 1: If the median citizen enters the race no other citizen would be
willing to enter. Let’s prove this proposition by contradiction. Assume that the citizen
candidate s enters the race. We know by definition that conditions (6) and (7) must be
met. For the citizen candidate s to enter the race he must have at least 1/2 probability of
winning it. If this were not the case, the candidate that loses will prefer to withdraw and
not incur in the cost of entry. For s to have at least half the probability of winning it, s
would have to be the median. But as there are no ego rent in this model, no other median
would enter the race and pay the fixed cost once other median citizen have already done
it, because wM(gM)− F ≥ wM(gM) when F > 0.
The second part involves proving that the median has incentives to enter the race. If
the median does not enter the race, the status quo g will prevail. If the median decides
to enter the race, she will win and have as a payoff wM(gM) − F . Since we know that
wM(gM) − F ≥ wM(g) the median will enter the race and win it. From the condition
above F ≤ wM(gM)− wM(g) and F < yM(1− τM) where τM is the tax rate selected by
the median after she wins the election.
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Proof of Proposition 2: We will show the proof for citizen of income type L but the
proof is symmetric for the citizen income type R. Let’s denote G as the utility of staying
out of the race for citizen of income type L
G = wL(gR)
and D as the utility of winning the race for citizen of income type L
D = wL(gL)
Also denote the differential utility of winning the race for income type L is
P = [wL(gL)− wL(gR)]
In any two candidate equilibrium each candidate will have 1/2 probability of winning.
If this were not the case, the candidate that loses will prefer to withdraw and not incur
in the cost of entry F . For the probability to be 1/2 for each the candidates’s position
must be symmetric around the median. For this to be an equilibrium, and letting ζ be
the distance from the median this requirement implies that for candidate of income type
L
1/2D + 1/2G− F ≥ G
or
(1/2)[wL(gL)− wL(gR)] ≥ F
There are multiple two candidates equilibria functions of ζ. Let’s define a particular ζ
to characterize the two candidate equilibria for this particular ζ. If ζ = 1/6, and knowing
that m = 1/2. In this case no other citizen would wish to enter the race, because it will
not have the necessary votes to win the election. Those to the left of L would vote for L
and those to the right of R would vote for R. As for the citizens in the interval between
the L and the median and between R and the median, half would choose the median and
the other half L and R respectively.
For the two candidates, L and R to enter the race, it is needed that
(1/2)[wL(gL)− wL(gR)] ≥ F
and a symmetric condition for R
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(1/2)[wR(gR)− wR(gL)] ≥ F
For this to be possible F ≤ F , where F is a function of ζ. The value of F is the
maximum of two conditions, whichever is binding.
(i) F = (1/2)P
(ii) y(M−ζ)(1− τL/2− τR/2) = F
ζ could take values in the interval (0, ζc). If ζ = 0 two candidate equilibria is not
possible because the two candidates would be in the position of the median and as there
are no ego rent in the model, one of them would rather not run and save the cost of entry.
The value of ζc will be determined by the above conditions. If the restrictions on F are
not binding ζc is equal to 1/3, its maximum possible value to guarantee a two candidate
equilibria. If ζ > 1/3 citizens ∈ (yL, yR) between the two candidates would have incentives
to run because they would win the election. If F is binding ζc will be lower than 1/3 but
always above 0. ζc takes a value in the interval (0, 1/3).
Proof of Proposition 3:
If a citizen - candidate with an income ∈ [Yc1, Yc2] enters the race, no other citizen
would be willing to enter. First, no citizen to the right of Yc2 will enter because it will
collect less votes that her rival. Second, no citizen to the left of Yc1 will enter because
condition (6) is binding, F = Yc1(1− τ).
Now, consider that Yc1 enters the race. Then, no one else wishes to enter the race. The
second part involves proving that she incentives to enter the race. If Yc1 does not enter
the race, the status quo g will prevail. If Yc1 decides to enter the race, she will win and
have as a payoff wYc1(gYc1) − F . Since we know that wYc1(gYc1) − F ≥ wM(g) so Yc1 will
enter the race and win it.
Now, consider that y > Yc1 enters the race. Then, no candidate to the right wishes to
enter the race. For this to be an equilibrium it is needed that no one ∈ [Yc1, y) has an
incentive to enter. The condition wy(gy) − F ≥ wy(gYc1) implies that the value of F is
such that candidates ∈ [Yc1, y) prefers to let y win the race and not have to pay the fixed
cost to enter the race. The second part involves proving that she incentives to enter the
race. As we showed above Yc1 have incentives to enter the race. A candidate to the right
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of Yc1 will have more incentives to enter, since status quo is father away from her preferred
policy.
Now, consider F = Yc1 = YHI . Then the highest income citizen is the only candidate
running and win the race. There is no fiscal policy and income market inequality is equal
to disposable income inequality.
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Annex for Table 2
Table 5: Annex - Redistribution in Latin America in perspective
Country Market Income Disposable Income Redistribution
Inequality Inequality Effect
Argentina 49.99 48.11 1.88
Brazil 56.03 54.27 1.76
Chile 47.23 45.57 1.66
Colombia 56.76 52.16 4.6
Mexico 50.98 49.44 1.54
Peru 48.59 47.94 0.65
Latin America 51.6 49.58 2.02
Austria 38 25 13
Belgium 47 29 18
Denmark 49 29 20
Finland 49 32 17
France 42 31 11
Germany 43 28 15
Greece 47 36 11
Ireland 53 34 19
Italy 48 37 11
Luxembourg 41 24 17
Netherlands 39 26 13
Portugal 49 38 11
Spain 47 35 22
Sweden 45 29 16
UK 52 34 18
Europe 45.9 31.1 14.8
Note: To measure inequality the Gini coefficient is used. The data comes from Goni et al (2009).
Annex for Table 3
Table 3 is based on data from national representative surveys conducted by Vanderbilt
University during 2006 for individual countries in Latin America as well as in United
States and in Canada. The table reports the answers to the following questions: a)
What does democracy primarily means to you? Percentage of negative opinions. The
following questions ask citizens to evaluate different statements in an scale from 1 to 7
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; b) Support for (your own country) Political System c) Respect for (your own country)
Political Institutions d) Proud of living under (your own country) Political System. For
answer where the mean of the population was between 1-3 I label them Low, for 3.01-5
Medium and for 5.01-7 High.
Annex for Figure 3
The figure 3 is based on data from national representative surveys conducted by Vanderbilt
University during 2006 for Chile, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Panama. The table reports the
answers to the following questions: Evaluate in an scale from 1 to 7 your Respect for
(your own country) Political Institutions. Using another question on people identification
to different income brackets I construct a variable for the mean answer in each income
group. In order to make the differences more visible the first income group (lower income
population) is used as a base group and is assigned a value of 100.
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Annex for Table 4
Table 6: Annex - History of Levels of Inequality and Trend Breaks in Latin America
Country Average Lower Upper Number of
Inequality Bound Bound Breaks in the Trend
Argentina 51.2 48.7 54.1 3
Bolivia 58 56.1 60.1 3
Brazil 58.3 54.8 62.8 4
Chile 54.7 51.8 56.1 4
Colombia 55.7 50 58.3 1
Costa Rica 47.3 44 49.8 2
Ecuador 55 49.5 62.8 2
El Salvador 51.2 48.4 53.4 5
Guatemala 55.1 53.2 58.2 -
Honduras 55.2 51.1 59.3 2
Mexico 52.3 49.9 54.6 2
Nicaragua 53.3 50.2 56.3 1
Panama 55.5 53.8 56.7 4
Paraguay 56 53.2 58.4 4
Peru 52.1 48.6 55.5 5
Uruguay 44.4 42.1 47.1 2
Venezuela 45.4 41.3 47.6 6
Note: To measure inequality the Gini coefficient is used. Own calculations based on SEDLAC(2009).
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